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At the turn of the twentieth century, Los Angeles was poised to become the
premier city on the West Coast. Within thirty years, the boosters, businessmen,
and politicians made it a reality. These people believed that the twentieth cen-
tury belonged to the city of Los Angeles, and they propelled the city into the
forefront. They did so by constructing a massive aqueduct system; annexing
lands to the east, west, and south of its original borders; developing a harbor;
building a massive infrastructure including roads and rail lines; instituting the
nation’s first zoning laws; and fostering financial investment. By 1930, the city
became the largest in the West, boasting a population of 1,238,084.
Despite the astronomical growth, Los Angeles’s success did not come with-
out pitfalls. During World War II, the city pushed its limits. Overwhelmed, the
city encountered severe housing shortages, urban blight, and limited
resources. After the war, additional migrants and increasing racial diversity
heightened tensions that exploded in a series of race-related disturbances.
Though Los Angeles confronted these challenges, its destiny is forever linked
to the pivotal years when it became the largest city in the West.
Together, the writings of Dana Cuff, Catherine Mulholland, Raphael
Sonenshein, and Jules Tygiel illuminate the ascent of the City of Angels
between 1877 and 1992. These four texts blend architectural history, urban
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history, and biography. Each presents different glimpses of the city in a partic-
ular phase of its development. Separately, and collectively, they capture a cen-
tury that witnesses the city’s evolution from town to metropolis, telling a tale
of intrigue, triumph, and tragedy.
William Mulholland (1855-1935), the chief engineer and architect of the
city’s water system, and the need to achieve a permanent and limitless water
supply have been the subject of numerous authors.1 William Mulholland and
the Rise of Los Angeles is the latest work to analyze the controversial man and
questionable municipal actions undertaken to find water for Los Angeles. This
account affords historian Catherine Mulholland an opportunity to give a
greater sense of dignity and humanity to her grandfather. That she succeeds in
doing so is just one highlight of an excellent biography.
Mulholland’s arrival in Los Angeles in 1877 coincided with the earliest
stages of urban development. The depression, drought, and smallpox epi-
demic that greeted the Irish immigrant were as old as the city itself. For
Mulholland, fresh water was the cure. Mulholland began his career in engi-
neering after a stint on artesian wells in Compton. A self-taught man, Mulhol-
land began working for the Los Angeles Water Company in 1878. Shortly
afterwards as a deputy “zanjero” or water overseer, he befriended Fred Eaton,
the future mayor, and William Perry, president of the water company.
The Los Angeles water system was faulty at best. There was never enough
water for constant irrigation of crops, control of the dust, or household use.
Competition between private companies created an exploitative environment.
As the original system was connected by wells, ditches, and canals, the Los
Angeles Water Company engaged in a modernizing project. At the same time,
the city needed protection from water damage created by floods and decaying
structures. This municipal underdevelopment provided a perfect training
ground for the novice engineer. By the time Mulholland became the superin-
tendent of the waterworks in 1886, he was the most qualified man for the
position.
Catherine Mulholland presents Mulholland’s career in stages, providing a
greater understanding of his role in civic affairs. The author argues that the pri-
vate side of William Mulholland influenced his public actions. Mulholland
considered himself a public servant, avoided criticizing others in public, and
joined social clubs more to protect his position rather than for true social
climbing (pp. 25-60). Catherine Mulholland suggests that William’s relation-
ships with the affluent Eaton and Perry were mentorships rather than close
friendships, in part because of class distinctions. Mulholland progressed from
a laborer to an aspiring member of the upper middle class but had no designs
on the privileged class (pp. 46-47). He never abandoned his working-class
roots. Mulholland dedicated his life to his family, his position, his workers,
and ultimately the people of Los Angeles.
In 1899, Mayor Fred Eaton embarked on several ideas that redefined the
growing metropolis and changed Mulholland’s life. He began the subdivision
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and development of tracts south of the city center; expanded the water system,
sewers, and local dams; and supported the construction of an electric rail sys-
tem (which eventually became Huntington’s “Big Red Cars”) to replace horse-
drawn carriages.
The campaign to acquire a municipal water system marked a turning point
in Los Angeles’s history. The city’s newspapers, which would later play a sig-
nificant role in civic affairs, entered the debate. Strong local support produced
an overwhelming victory at the polls. The city negotiated to purchase the Los
Angeles and Crystal Spring Water Companies, and Mulholland, acting as a
representative of the Los Angeles Water Company, mediated between his
superiors and the city. In 1902, when the transaction was completed, Mulhol-
land became the chief of the city’s system.
Mulholland presided over a system that needed to expand and improve ser-
vices. Mayors, city governments, the water commission, and the public con-
tested his vision and leadership. He overcame scandals concerning water
waste, bacteria, hygiene, faulty and new construction, and the lack of rainwa-
ter. While Mulholland earned the respect and admiration of the city, his sup-
port of Eaton’s plan to purchase land and water in Owens Valley was
considered suspicious at best and conspiratorial at worst. The Evening News,
the Herald, the Examiner, and the Times competed in putting additional spin
on this proposal that easily increased reader interest and discussion. When put
to a vote in 1905, despite apprehensions, Los Angeles residents voted over-
whelmingly to support the land purchase.
The vision shared by Eaton and Mulholland was strongly motivated by the
construction of the Croton Aqueduct in New York in 1882. However, the con-
struction of the Owens Valley aqueduct system, a 240-mile project, was con-
sidered unthinkable. Completed in 1913, it was hailed as a crowning achieve-
ment. Mulholland was encouraged to run for mayor and was bestowed with
living testimonials.
At that moment, Mulholland was one of the few who recognized that the
Owens Valley project was inadequate to fulfill the future needs of Los
Angeles. He argued for more dams, aqueducts, and hydroelectric power. He
proposed tapping the Colorado River and building a dam at Boulder Canyon.
This too became a contested issue in the papers as the Times and Examiner
debated its merits. While Boulder Dam became a reality, the fight continued
for more than a decade, increasing tensions over the staggering costs. In the
suburbs and hinterlands, there was the continued fear that Los Angeles was
stealing land, destroying homes, and dashing the dreams of farming communi-
ties. Heated political confrontations, violence, and passionate journalism
marked this final phase of Mulholland’s tenure.
It literally came to a crashing end in 1928. The St. Francis Dam, built in
1924, was one of the facilities Mulholland constructed to house the waters
obtained in the Owens Valley project. Its failure on March 13 represented the
end of the nineteenth-century engineering philosophy of which he was a
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student. The four hundred deaths and tremendous property loss stood as the
city’s greatest man-made disaster. The event created panic in communities
located below other dams and ultimately led to Mulholland’s departure from
public life. Though exonerated at the hearings, Mulholland’s spirit was
crushed.
William Mulholland presided over the water system during the city’s great-
est expansion. He had the wisdom to create a water supply that serviced a pop-
ulation nearly thirty times larger than originally designed. Mulholland worked
with politicians and businessmen who knew little of his work and only
demanded an adequate supply of water. And, despite his stoic manner, he was
just as visionary as the boosters more commonly recorded in the textbooks.
Mulholland was, in many respects, the founder of the modern city.
In contrast to Mulholland, Courtney Chauncey Julian (1885-1934) was a
personality many tried to forget. A year before the St. Francis Dam disaster,
the Julian Petroleum Company collapsed, leaving thousands with worthless
stock. The Great Los Angeles Swindle weaves a masterful account of Julian,
his companies, and his image of Los Angeles. Jules Tygiel presents a compel-
ling argument by providing a sweeping examination of Los Angeles and its cit-
izens. Divided into three sections, “Oil,” “Stocks,” and “Scandal,” the work
starts with the 1930 courthouse murder of Motley Flint, a leading booster, a
financier, the vice president of Pacific Southwest Bank, and the brother of for-
mer U.S. senator Frank Flint. It concludes with the murder-suicide of Helen
and Rosebud Harris in 1931. The volume suggests that the Julian scandal was a
crisis that touched every part of the city and had lingering effects. During the
1920s, the self-promoted golden city promised untold fortunes. Los Angeles
and its residents believed they were immune from the catastrophes that were
occurring in other parts of the nation. More than any other event, the Julian
scandal proved them wrong.
The idea of failure in Los Angeles was unthinkable to most, and the accom-
panying pain was intolerable. “The city and county of Los Angeles,” writes
Tygiel, “had long featured one of the highest suicide rates in the nation” (p. 310).
The murders and suicides associated with the Julian fiasco provided evidence
that the city was linked to crimes of greed and hate. However, the greed that
overtook small investors was not comparable to that of the elite. Tygiel
explains that the real tragedy was that Los Angeles realized that it was no
different from the rest of America and, perhaps, that its leaders were worse
(p. 310). To emphasize this point, he quotes pioneer Los Angeles historian
Carey McWilliams, who wrote, “It would have been possible to have assem-
bled in the prison yard of San Quentin, a group of former civic leaders, empire
builders, captains of industry and outstanding public officials from Southern
California.”2
Tygiel sees C. C. Julian as a mirror of the city’s soul. Without question,
Julian represents all that is good and bad about the new city. Thriving in a car-
nival-like environment, Julian sells the city, its wealth, and ultimately himself.
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A migrant, drawn from Canada to Los Angeles in search of fame and fortune,
Julian embodies the great wealth and vitality of the new city. His initial oil ven-
tures suggested that there were millions of dollars of revenue waiting for the
ambitious in the city’s backyard. And as a booster, Julian tapped into the gull-
ibility of those who came to Southern California in search of the American
dream.
Within weeks of his initial investment in Los Angeles oil fields, the local
newspapers made Julian a star. He wrote his own columns that were published
as advertisements. His best line was, “Julian refuses to accept your money
unless you can afford to lose! Widows and orphans, this is no investment for
you!” (p. 40). Such advertisements convinced readers that Julian was trying to
earn an honest dollar. Julian equally appeared willing to share the wealth. He
appealed to the hearts and minds of the poor by suggesting that these invest-
ments would yield long-term prosperity. Armed with the belief that his oils
wells, and later mines, could produce great wealth, thousands invested in his
schemes.
Julian was also a master showman. He took would-be clients to his wells
and mines by car or train, treated the crowds to meals, and often closed the fes-
tivities with music and dancing. His advertisements offered warnings that con-
noted signs of trust; he made promises, and for a brief moment he delivered.
The Julian Petroleum Company’s success was hampered by avarice. While
the Defiance Gas Stations were profitable, the oil wells generated insufficient
returns. Only Julian became rich, and desires to expand his empire raised the
suspicions of Edwin Daugherty, the California corporation commissioner, the
press, and the investment community. Unfortunately, most attempts to prove
that Julian was dishonest did not sever his relationship with the public but
rather accentuated it. Julian defeated the Corporation Commission by trans-
forming himself into the people’s champion. He outsmarted the Times by cre-
ating the Truth, a paper for the average citizen. Over a decade, Julian used the
bond established between him and the man on the street to demonstrate that the
wealthy, too, were distrustful and had conspired against the average investor.
Until his final demise, Julian retained a core of staunch supporters.
The fraudulent nature of Julian’s transactions and the need for cash led him
to form a partnership with Oklahoma oilman S. C. Lewis in 1924. By the fol-
lowing year, Lewis forced Julian to surrender ownership of Julian Pete, leav-
ing Julian no choice but to pursue other interests. During the next two years,
Lewis figured out how to manipulate his ledgers, favorably adjust stock prices,
oversell shares, purchase reputable companies without cash, and make a small
fortune. In 1926, Lewis negotiated a merger and managed to remain solvent
through the creation of secret pools for wealthy investors. In 1927, with more
than a half-million over issued shares and the discovery of the pools, the Julian
Petroleum Company’s stock collapsed and upset the fiber of the Los Angeles
Stock Exchange.
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The disasters of the 1920s were a blot on the city’s legacy. Tygiel reveals
that the scandal involved police officers, FBI agents, and the prosecutor’s
office. Key members of the stock exchange accepted bribes and gave special
treatment to Julian Petroleum. Indeed, the entire fabric of the society was
harmed. Yet the Times reflected the attitudes of the boosters and economic
community, who were more concerned with the need to save the institutions of
the city than punish the guilty. Voices outside the mainstream, like the resur-
rected Julian and the Reverend Bob Schuler, used radio shows and periodicals
to level charges against the elite and demand justice for the lower classes.
In the final analysis, few were truly punished. C. C. Julian, who lost every-
thing in Los Angeles, was indicted for mail fraud for an oil scheme in
Oklahoma. He skipped bail, fled the country, and died penniless in China.
Some bankers, politicians, investors, and businessmen went to jail, but their
incarcerations were brief. The Julian Petroleum Company was placed in
receivership.
The Julian and, to a lesser extent, the St. Francis incidents revealed that the
city often failed to compensate all of the victims. Los Angeles tried to escape
the legacy of failure by changing names or merging companies. Yet many of
the parties involved in the tragedies and frauds had a hand in the new enter-
prises. The banks involved in the Julian scandal found safety in consolidation.
Fearing collapse, the First National Bank agreed to a merger with the Security
Trust and Savings. Similarly, the Bank of Italy absorbed the tainted Merchants
National Bank. The receivers of the merged Julian Petroleum and California-
Eastern Oil companies reincorporated the company as the Sunset Pacific Oil
Company. And on a municipal level, the city’s two utilities became the Depart-
ment of Water and Power in 1929 as an aftermath of the St. Francis Dam
incident.
By 1930, Los Angeles counted the largest minority community on the West
Coast. Significant numbers of Japanese, Chinese, Mexicans, and African
Americans lived in and around downtown Los Angeles. Complementing them
was a larger number of poor European immigrants. Dana Cuff’s The Provi-
sional City considers this social transformation in terms of the use of space and
land development in Los Angeles County. She investigates the transformation
of five Los Angeles communities starting with the New Deal policies of the
1930s and progressing to the modern city of the 1990s.
Cuff describes the history of the settings and the types of housing built in
each location. Although this specialized material has greater appeal to an
architect or architectural historian, it is not beyond the grasp of the layman. If
William Mulholland was the creator of the modern city, Cuff would claim that
he only built its infrastructure. “In order to grasp the form of the contemporary
city, and how it is significantly transformed,” Cuff believes that one must
“scrutinize the great schemes imposed there” (p. 5). By examining large-scale
developments during this seventy-year period, she evaluates Los Angeles’s
great evolution.
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The catalyst for change, according to Cuff, is the 1929 stock market crash.
Afterwards, federal and state governments restructured the building industry
from banking to construction to real estate development, creating a market for
a new type of standardized housing unit, which gave way to the tract houses
that compose contemporary suburbs. Cuff indicates that the 1930s mark the
beginning of the house as a well-built, affordable, and mass-produced box.
By the 1960s, the box was marketed to an increasing and vast middle class.
This transformation of the house occurs “at the same time as the population
grew strikingly more diverse, through immigration, increasing numbers of
women in the workforce, the undermining of racial segregation and domestic
migration” (p. 9). And as uniform housing permeated both sides of the urban
divide, public housing units, designed by leading architects, emerged in the
core to combat against the slum.
Because Los Angeles needed nearly a half-million housing units in the
postwar era, space was highly contested. Often, the desired areas initially
housed ethnic and racial minorities. The uniform fear of the slum and these
groups usually led to the demands for their removal. Cuff demonstrates, from
newly found photographs, that not all of the designated slum communities
consisted solely of substandard housing. Often, she explains, there was simply
a need to reclaim space. Open spaces and residential spaces were redesigned
for aesthetic and environmental purposes. Once these areas were targeted, the
planners and developers employed new ideas in the construction.
Federal funding made numerous developments possible. Los Angeles
recruited well-respected architects to design large-scale developments, and
some worked with contractors to design private housing units. Through their
efforts, the Los Angeles Housing Authority produced a variety of public hous-
ing styles during the 1940s and early 1950s. Richard Neutra and Robert Alex-
ander’s Elysian Park Heights, Lloyd Wright’s Aliso Village, and the Quonset
hut Rodger Young Village illustrated new housing schemes in deteriorating or
underused areas.
Elysian Park Heights was planned in the underdeveloped Chavez Ravine, a
predominately Mexican settlement. It was designed to have 3,300 units in
high-rise and low-rise buildings. Aliso was constructed in 1941 and opened
the following year. It replaced Boyle Heights Flats, largely a Russian commu-
nity, regarded as the worst slum in the city. Designed to feature green space and
community amenities such as schools and nurseries, Aliso gave preference to
war workers. The Russians and Mexicans who had lived in the “flats” were dis-
placed. Rodger Young Village was temporary housing designed for war veter-
ans, many who chose not to go home after returning to the states. Built on a
converted airfield in 1946, its Quonset huts were quickly assembled and the
village was operational in ninety days. Yet in 1954, despite the wishes of most
residents to remain, the village was closed. In its place came parking lots for
the Los Angeles Zoo and the Autry Museum.
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At the other end of the real estate spectrum were the more valued lands,
where no one lost their homes but rather purchased them. Westchester repre-
sented the private developers’use of space. It is a planned inner suburb, a short
distance from Los Angeles International Airport, whose developers, including
Fritz Burns, were opponents of public housing. During the 1940s and early
1950s, Westchester was promoted as a racially exclusive middle-class suburb
of single-family homes. Similarly, Playa Vista was a planned public and pri-
vate enterprise in a coastal enclave owned by Howard Hughes. Following his
death, developers proposed a mixed-use project with 1,024 acres of residential
and commercial properties.
Quietly, by the early 1950s, developers were able to amass a strong cam-
paign against public housing. Cuff reveals that large-scale public and private
housing was constructed at nearly the same costs, and this influenced the
developers’ positions. One major confrontation pitted Frank Wilkinson, the
long-standing liberal employee of the housing authority, against developer
Fritz Burns. The authority was weakly supported by Mayor Fletcher Bowron
and elements of the Communist Party, but a larger faction including the Times,
the Kaiser Corporation, the Committee against Socialist Housing, other devel-
opers, and the Catholic Church rallied behind Burns.
Local residents organized to save their communities. Integrated groups suc-
cessfully contested issues in Rodger Young Village, but they could not save
their community from destruction. Attempts to halt the demolition of homes in
Chavez Ravine were also unsuccessful, and the fight against the construction
of public housing was successful in Elysian Park. Burns and his associates sti-
fled Los Angeles’s involvement in public housing.
Burns, portrayed as both villain and innovator, emerges as one of the most
important figures in Cuff’s work. He was also a property owner in Chavez
Ravine, and when he joined the Elysian Park protests, they won a major vic-
tory. During the court proceedings, Burns questioned Wilkinson’s loyalty to
the nation in reference to communism. Unwilling to answer, Wilkinson was
driven out of office, and the entire housing authority suffered. Supported by
the builders, Los Angeles terminated its public housing contract. After a court
case, local support in Congress, and additional negotiations, the city settled its
contracts with the federal government.
Although public housing was not built at Chavez Ravine, the homes were
not saved. The city dedicated the land to park space and in a series of compli-
cated negotiations, with Walter O’Malley, donated the land for the construc-
tion of Dodger Stadium. Once again, press opinions were telling. The Times,
as a booster, supported the arrangement, while the News-Herald and the Jour-
nal, as advocates of the displaced property holders, denounced the decision.
As The Provisional City reveals, the life and death of a neighborhood is a
complicated process. While the architects created imaginative ideas, from the
modernist notions of Richard Neutra to the contemporary ones of the new
urbanism, the residents in these communities pay little interest to the designs.
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Their fears and aspirations lay not in the efforts of the designers but in the
thoughts of public and private figures who are in constant motion questioning
the use of space.
The backroom politics of race and class that are essential to Cuff’s work
make a larger appearance in the writings of political scientist Raphael
Sonenshein. Politics in Black and White examines the rise of Tom Bradley as
mayor of Los Angeles (1973-1993).3 Bradley, a former policeman, becomes
the first black elected to the city council and later the first black mayor by serv-
ing the city’s African American population as well as a multiracial coalition of
progressive citizens. The idea of coalition is central to Sonenshein’s thesis.
Blacks and whites, he argues, unite through a series of common interests, pro-
ducing not one but numerous coalitions.
Furthermore, Bradley serves as a window to the other Los Angeles with a
political career framed by the Watts Riots in 1965 and the Rodney King Riots
of 1992. While there was some degree of economic prosperity and significant
home ownership, Los Angeles blacks never fared as well as their counterparts
in other large cities. Despite the 1948 Supreme Court decision against restric-
tive covenants, African Americans remained ghettoized within the heart of the
city. Amazingly, while most blacks were contained in a handful of election dis-
tricts, they lacked political power at the beginning of the 1960s. Latinos and
Jews, in contrast, had already gained some vestige of political power and had
seats on the city council.
Between the late 1940s and the early 1960s, Sonenshein argues that the city,
downtown business, and the Times engaged in practices to limit black (and
other nonwhite) participation in governmental affairs. In most circumstances,
the city isolated and divided ethnic minorities. To the benefit of the mayor, his
constituents, and those in the city government, Los Angeles consistently reor-
ganized election districts to ensure white majorities. On numerous occasions,
this practice prevented a black majority.
Public housing, as Cuff’s study of Rodger Young Village indicates, was an
exception to the division of the races. Groups within this and other housing
complexes formed coalitions challenging the political authority. This might
have been the start of the first political coalition between blacks, Latinos, and
whites. However, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), one of the
most conservative elements in the city, was antiblack and uncomfortable with
the biracial alliance. The text alludes that the LAPD tried to deter political
organization within public housing complexes as it gave rise to these alliances.
It visibly used its weight to back mayoral candidates who supported its issues
(p. 32). Led by Chief William Parker, the LAPD closely scrutinized Mayors
Bowron, Poulson, and Yorty. Even Parker’s successor, Daryl Gates,
challenged Bradley when he took office.
The 1960 census disclosure that African Americans increased from 8.7 per-
cent to 13 percent of the city is seen as the true initiation of the political coali-
tion. Democratic Assemblymen Augustus Hawkins, the sole black elected
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official in the city, and Jesse Unruh were in charge of the city’s reappointment.
Hawkins brokered for a deal in the senate and assembly, but within the city
there was no concession. Instead, the black neighborhoods were split into five
districts, and only one, the eighth, had a black majority.
Upstart Democrat Sam Yorty’s campaign for mayor in 1961 produced the
first true coalition. His defeat of Norris Poulson represented a victory over the
traditional political organizations, the Times, and organized business. Yorty
received the support of San Fernando Valley home owners and inner-city
minorities by promising valley residents to end the trash separation process
that led to the use of two garbage cans and by offering to appoint minorities to
city commissions and to fight police brutality. However, once in office, he
balked at naming an African American to the tenth district’s vacant city coun-
cil seat. Not deterred, the Eagle and the Sentinel, Los Angeles’s two black
newspapers, and black coalitions mobilized, promoted a recall movement, and
solicited candidates. When the court blocked the recall, they decided to contest
the seat in the next election and worked to force the city council to select
Gilbert Lindsay to fill the vacant historic Latin seat in the ninth. As a result, in
the 1963 council elections, Lindsay ran as an incumbent in the ninth, two black
challengers Everette Porter (supported by Yorty) and Billy Mills (supported
by the community) opposed each other in the eighth, and Tom Bradley ran as
the challenger in the tenth. On March 28, Bradley won outright with a majority
of the black vote and even numbers of the white vote. Two months later on May
28, Mills and Lindsay won in runoffs. The foundation of Bradley’s coalition
was laid.
Sonenshein examines how Bradley’s initial election changed the nature of
black Los Angeles and offers greater possibilities. Democratic regulars, such
as Mervyn Dymally and Jesse Unruh, solicited rank-and-file African Ameri-
can support. Bradley, a reformer, appealed to a more diverse group. His base
consisted of less educated and moderate Latinos, progressive Asians, more
educated and upwardly mobile blacks, and highly educated and progressive
whites. Bradley empowered African Americans and other minorities to vote
not solely for race but by issue.
Following Bradley’s election as mayor, he developed both white and black
allies, and time and time again, Bradley assisted their political aspirations.
Sonenshein is equally adept in analyzing the two factions that developed from
the black political organizations. He explains how the Bradley-Dymally
rivalry produced two machines for breeding future candidates. Major benefi-
ciaries of this movement include Yvonne Brathwaite Burke and Maxine
Waters, who later left the Bradley camp to form her own organization.
However, what makes Sonenshein’s text so rich is the story of the mayoral
election, the expansion of the Bradley coalition, the development of his
machine, and the confrontations with the old order. The author covers these
issues in great detail and provides significant numerical and statistical data.
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His vast collection of interviews and involvement during the Bradley years
provides further insight to the complicated issues.
One of the particularly interesting situations is the Rodney King affair,
which pushed Bradley to demand Chief Gates’s resignation. Contrary to the
notion that this event separated the city and severely tested the strength of the
Bradley coalition, Sonenshein argues that the coalition held remarkably well
and had bounced back from the banking scandal. He reveals that most blacks,
Latinos, and liberal whites viewed Bradley favorably after the King beating. In
contrast, the city council did not support the mayor’s decision to place Chief
Gates on leave. Only Michael Woo, the lone Asian councilman, supported
Gates’s ouster. Where, according to Sonenshein, Bradley fails is in the days
following his call for Gates to resign and in the aftermath of the riots. With
waning support in the council, Bradley rallied his black voters. While African
Americans and Latinos backed him, everyone else did not. The Christopher
Commission report briefly aided Bradley, and then the riots occurred. Across
the board, even among communities of color, Bradley’s stock fell. Polls
revealed that his once significant white base slipped well below fifty percent.
Sonenshein credits Proposition F, the bill to reform the LAPD, with the resto-
ration of the coalition. In key districts, Latinos and moderate whites favored
the measure, while Jews, liberal whites, and blacks gave it overwhelming sup-
port. Only among conservative whites did the legislation fail to receive fifty
percent of the vote. While blacks, liberals, and Jews had reunited, Bradley rec-
ognized his time as the leader of the coalition had past. He did not seek a sixth
term.
In the post-Bradley years, the Republicans returned to power. The hope was
that Michael Woo would parlay the successful formula to victory. The fact that
he lost to conservative Richard Riordan raised new questions about the
strength of the coalition. Unfortunately, Sonenshein’s study ends with the
Riordan-Woo contest and simply does not provide enough information about
the Asian relationship to the coalitions to explain why Woo failed. James
Hahn’s recent victory over Antonio Villaraigosa, which took place after the
book’s publication, represents another challenge to Sonenshein’s thesis and
raises additional concerns about the future of the coalitions. However, these
failures to produce the city’s last two mayors do not suggest that coalitions are
no longer possible but rather highlight Sonenshein’s secondary point that trust
between minority and majority participants is essential for the fulfillment of
identifiable goals.
While time will be the final judge of his theory, Sonenshein’s assessment of
the Bradley years is correct. The mayor made Los Angeles a Pacific Rim city
by attracting international business and tourism. He campaigned for invest-
ment in South Central, encouraged massive downtown redevelopment, and
hosted the first profitable Olympics. During the course of his five terms,
Bradley found a way to bring minorities, women, whites, and downtown
Wilson / THE RISE OF THE GOLDEN CITY 285
business together. His failings were always present, but they were magnified
during his failed campaigns for governor and became obvious after his fourth
election. Bradley lacked the type of personal style to abate the worries of the
skeptic. He equally suffered from an increasing inability to balance the needs
of the liberal whites and more militant blacks. Yet none of the key areas of dif-
ference between his white and black constituents, such as the lack of afford-
able housing, Pacific oil drilling, the Farrakhan speech, or King beating,
affected his standing at the polls. Instead, it was a financial scandal concerning
Bradley’s unorthodox ties to local banks that did the most damage to his image
as a trustworthy figure.
These four books are substantive additions to the increasing literature on the
Los Angeles experience. In many ways, Mulholland, Sonenshein, Tygiel, and
Cuff are revisionists, but they also provide new approaches to the material. Los
Angeles is the central player in their stories. Cuff’s monograph may be the
only one that can be associated with the “Los Angeles School,” but all clearly
highlight the belief that Los Angeles departs from all eastern and midwestern
cities.
The authors establish this point in two manners. First, they draw compari-
sons with East Coast or midwestern cities to reveal distinctions, and second,
they place Los Angeles within the growing competition between western cit-
ies for supremacy. The following statement by Sonenshein is illustrative:
Los Angeles is the prototypical western metropolis—a city of the twentieth cen-
tury, built by entrepreneurial visionaries on a path quite different from that of
eastern and midwestern cities. The twin concepts of boom and reform that
underlie the experience of Sun Belt cities have characterized the spectacular
growth of Los Angeles. (P. 13)
As the Croton project is compared to the Owens Valley project, William
Mulholland can be compared to New York’s famed Robert Moses. Yet in con-
trast to Robert Caro’s and Joel Schwartz’s biographies, none of Mulholland’s
biographies are of an embittered character.4
Mulholland is seen as a tough but likeable man of honor. He, like Moses,
appears to be a king, in the sense that his career as superintendent spans more
than fifty years and covers the terms of nineteen mayors, but his status was
favorable before the St. Francis tragedy. Mulholland’s story implies that he
should be considered one of the nation’s best public servants, ranked higher
than his New York counterpart.
Jules Tygiel broadens the perspective of the Julian saga by making the
cityscape the centerpiece of his story. The underlying emphasis of the text sug-
gests that the speculation and corruption associated with Julian Pete are a
product of the uncontrollable urge to make Los Angeles better than San Fran-
cisco and more like Chicago and New York.
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Raphael Sonenshein makes a similar point. He states his interest in New
York City in the preface and in the final chapter speaks strongly to its failures.
Politics in Black and White is not only an analysis of Los Angeles but a com-
parison of black mayoral elections. Sonenshein argues that the coalition that
produced Bradley’s election indicates that Los Angeles strategists achieved
victories that had not occurred in other cities. The election of black men in
overwhelming black secondary cities such as Cleveland, Gary, and Newark
did not assist Bradley. Similarly, Bradley accomplished something not dupli-
cated in Chicago or New York. That these two primary cities, with substantial
black populations, could not elect African American candidates without solid
black/minority support enhances the idea that Los Angeles is unique. The
model, for a city that is less than twenty percent black, used multiracial coali-
tions that unified liberal whites with some conservative whites. This did not
happen in New York and Chicago, as conservatives refused to support the
black candidate. However, the Los Angeles model was later duplicated with
success in Seattle and San Francisco and on a smaller scale in New Haven,
Connecticut.
The idea of difference also flows throughout Dana Cuff’s work. She argues
that the nation’s housing policies were mandated from Washington and New
York, which had very different housing concerns. Furthermore, conditions in
Los Angeles worsened when suburbanization exploded in Los Angeles in the
1940s and the war created a housing shortage. Her best examples center on
Rodger Young Village’s use of Quonset huts as homes, its sense of home own-
ership within the core, and its number of minorities. Similarly, Westchester is a
suburban model that precedes Levittown. Throughout the text, Cuff compares
events in New York and several other communities, including Houston and
Chicago, to those in Los Angeles to establish her points.
Although the City of Los Angeles did not become the nation’s first city,
many social scientists suggest it is poised to do so during this century.5 If con-
cepts of urban development truly pass from the East Coast to the Midwest and
then to the West, Los Angeles highlights the growth of the frontier. Then per-
haps, more than any other American city, the twentieth century does embody
Los Angeles. Brash, innovative, and resilient, Los Angeles did and continues
to do things in its own unique style. While maintaining its frontier image, the
city has developed a cosmopolitan flair to rival New York and Chicago, com-
plete with skyscrapers and social, cultural, and financial facilities.
—Leslie Wilson
Montclair State University
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